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Abstract: To find the neural substrates of consciousness, researchers compare subjects’ neural 
activity when they are aware of stimuli against neural activity when they are not aware. 
Ideally, to guarantee that the neural substrates of consciousness—and nothing but the neural 
substrates of consciousness—are isolated, the only difference between these two contrast 
conditions should be conscious awareness. Nevertheless, in practice, it is quite challenging to 
eliminate confounds and irrelevant differences between conscious and unconscious conditions. 
In particular, there is an often-neglected confound that is crucial to eliminate from 
neuroimaging studies: task performance. Unless subjects’ task performance is matched (and 
hence perceptual signal processing is matched), researchers risk finding the neural correlates 
of perception, rather than conscious perception. Here, we discuss the theoretical motivations 
for the performance matching framework and review empirical demonstrations of, and 
theoretical inferences derived from, obtaining differences in consciousness while controlling 
for task performance. We summarize signal detection theoretic modeling frameworks that 
explain how it is that we can derive performance-matched differences in consciousness without 
the effect being trivially driven by differences in criterion setting, and also provide principles 
for designing experimental paradigms that yield performance-matched differences in 
awareness. Finally, we address potential technical and theoretical issues that stem from 
matching performance across conditions of awareness, and we introduce the notion of 
“triangulation” for designing comprehensive experimental sets that can better reveal the 
neural substrates of consciousness. 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine you are driving with your friend at night on a poor-lit road. Both of you have 20/20 
vision, are used to driving at night, and are attentively looking at the road to ensure there 
are no surprises. Suddenly, your friend yelps: “Watch out!”—there is a large branch in the 
middle of the lane. You avoid it just in time, but only thanks to your friend’s warning: you 
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had not noticed the branch before you were alerted to it. How can this be? How could, under 
similar perceptual circumstances, your friend experience the obstacle while you completely 
miss it? One plausible explanation is that your friend consciously saw the branch while you 
did not. At the crucial moment, your visual experience of the road did not include any debris—
you were unaware of it.  
 This example illustrates important aspects of how philosophers and neuroscientists 
think about consciousness, which is commonly characterized as “what it is like” to be in a 
particular mental state (Nagel, 1974). For example, there is something that it is like to see 
the branch while, presumably, there is nothing it is like to be a camera that records the visual 
properties of the road. This notion of consciousness can be extended beyond visual 
experiences to include other sensory modalities (e.g. auditory or gustatory), feelings and 
emotions, pains, and perhaps even the conscious experience of having thoughts and desires.  
This subjective feeling of what it is like to be conscious of a particular content (e.g. the 
branch on the road) is referred to as phenomenal consciousness. In contrast, access 
consciousness describes the functional aspects of being consciously aware of contents as they 
become accessible to cognitive systems such as working memory, reasoning, categorization, 
planning, decision-making, and more generally, rational control of action (Block, 1995, 2005, 
2007).  
Were you phenomenally aware of the branch but failed to access the conscious 
representation of it, such that your voluntary motor control mechanisms did not steer the 
wheel appropriately? Perhaps your conscious experience was rich and included the content 
<branch> but it was not accessible by your categorization and decision-making systems—
which are supposed to have a more limited capacity and, at least in principle, they are distinct 
and independent from your phenomenal consciousness (Block, 2005, 2007, 2011; Lamme, 
2010). Alternatively, perhaps your phenomenal experience of the road lacked any branch 
altogether; perhaps it did not include the content <branch>: there was no phenomenally 
conscious branch that your cognitive mechanisms failed to access (Phillips, 2011). Of course, 
it might well be the case that this sensible conceptual distinction does not reflect how things 
are split up in the mind and brain. Perhaps there is no phenomenal consciousness without 
access consciousness (Cohen, Cavanagh, Chun, & Nakayama, 2012; Cohen & Dennett, 2011; 
Stanislas Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006) or perhaps access 
consciousness capacity is not limited with respect to phenomenal consciousness (Gross & 
Flombaum, 2017). Even if these two types of consciousness are distinct in principle, it could 
be impossible to know what phenomenal experiences you are in if you cannot access them 
(Kouider, de Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010; Kouider, Sackur, & Gardelle, 2012).  
Orthogonal to the phenomenal and access distinction, different things could be meant 
when we talk about consciousness (Rosenthal, 1993). We could mean transitive or content-
consciousness, namely, when one is conscious of a particular content (e.g. being conscious of 
the branch); state-consciousness, namely, when a mental state itself is conscious (e.g. the 
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conscious experience of seeing the branch in contrast to perceptually processing the branch 
albeit unconsciously); and creature-consciousness, namely, the overall conscious state of 
someone as an individual (e.g. someone awake compared to someone asleep, anaesthetized, 
or in a coma (Bayne et al., 2016). 
 
The Scientific Study of Consciousness 
Can we know, from a scientific point of view, what explains the difference in conscious 
contents between you and your friend? Theoretical and practical concerns may cause one to 
question the possibility of a scientific study of consciousness. From a purely theoretical 
standpoint, many philosophers and scientists share the intuition that studying access 
consciousness in general, and perceptual processing in particular, is “easy”. That is, while 
understanding how we perceive the environment is challenging, understanding access 
consciousness and perceptual processing does not seem to pose a distinct theoretical 
challenge compared to other psychological and brain phenomena we study: perceptual and 
decision-making mechanisms compute information, and that is something that, at least in 
principle, we know how to study. In contrast, understanding phenomenal consciousness is 
sometimes considered to be “hard” (Chalmers, 1996). The idea is that even if we found what 
the neural correlates of conscious experiences are, these would still fail to explain why those 
biophysical processes give rise to those subjective experiences. This so-called hard problem 
of consciousness has garnered much attention in the last 25 years; however, not everyone 
shares the intuition that we should be troubled by the alleged irreducibility of consciousness 
(Bickle, 2008; Godfrey-Smith, 2008). The metaphysical assumptions of the problem can be 
rejected, as they involve a notion of deductive explanation that is too stringent (Taylor, 2016). 
Furthermore, phenomenal consciousness is supported by brain activity: understanding the 
neural substrates of consciousness should be within the purview of scientific research.  
To study consciousness scientifically, researchers aim to create conditions that probe 
the thresholds of awareness, where stimuli are processed at an intermediate level of efficacy 
that yields graded levels of awareness ranging from complete unconsciousness to clear, full-
blown awareness. These conditions may be achieved by, for example, presenting a mask right 
before or after the stimulus (forward/backward masking); presenting distinct images to each 
eye effectively yielding one of them invisible (binocular rivalry and continuous flash 
suppression); degrading the contrast or the presentation duration of the stimulus; using 
constant stimulation that, however, can be perceived in different ways (bistable figures); or 
disrupting visual processing with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Thus, these 
conditions allow scientists to contrast subjects’ experiencing something against experiencing 
nothing (Fleming, 2019), i.e. detection (e.g. a branch versus nothing); or they can contrast 
experiencing this compared to experiencing that, i.e. discrimination (e.g. a branch versus a 
snake). Importantly, these contrasts can be characterized in an all or nothing fashion, or they 
can take into account relative levels of awareness, too. For example, you could be either aware 
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or unaware of the branch, but you could also be less aware of the branch than your friend, or 
more aware now than you were before your friend yelped.  
When searching for the neural substrates of consciousness, scientists look for the 
minimally jointly sufficient neural events required for having a conscious experience 
(Chalmers, 2000). To find these substrates, they compare the neural activity of subjects when 
they are (more) aware of stimuli against neural activity when they are not (or less) aware of 
them. When subtracting neural activity of the unconscious states from the conscious ones, 
the remaining activity should reveal the unique neural processes that support consciousness. 
Besides this kind of subtraction, scientists can also compare patterns of activity or 
connectivity profiles across conditions. Ideally, to guarantee that the neural substrates of 
consciousness—and nothing but the neural substrates of consciousness—are isolated, the 
only difference between these two contrast conditions should be phenomenal consciousness. 
For instance, the story at the beginning of the chapter would not be so surprising if you did 
not have 20/20 vision, if you were not paying attention, or if your friend had much more 
experience driving at night than you. Translating this scenario to the lab, this means that 
we need to ensure that the perceptual, attentional, and cognitive demands of a task, as well 
as the subjects’ performance in it, are matched when subjects are aware and unaware. Then, 
and only then, we can expect to learn what the neural substrates of consciousness are.  
Nevertheless, in practice, it is quite challenging to eliminate confounds and irrelevant 
differences between conscious and unconscious conditions. In particular, there is an often-
neglected confound that is, however, crucial to eliminate from neuroimaging studies: task 
performance.  
 
Task Performance: A Confound in Neuroimaging Studies 
Task performance is the objective effectiveness with which subjects succeed in achieving an 
experiment’s goal. On the road, the goal is to detect debris; your friend is objectively more 
effective at this task than you: their task performance is better than yours. In the lab, 
consider a task that consists in identifying the shape of a stimulus that is presented on the 
screen on multiple trials. A straightforward way of measuring someone’s task performance 
is by computing the percentage of correct responses they provide across all the trials. Thus, 
task performance is an important reflection of subjects’ capacity to process the perceptual 
signal (which is required for succeeding at the task at hand). However, when task 
performance differs across conscious and unconscious conditions, behavioral, perceptual, and 
cognitive capacities can be expected to differ as well. Most of the time, unless experimenters 
actively make an effort to match subjects’ performance, performance is higher in conscious 
trials than in unconscious trials. On the road, when your friend is conscious of the branch, 
they are also more likely to detect its presence, to discern its location, to identify it as a branch 
and not a snake, etc. Problematically, because variations in awareness typically are closely 
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correlated with variations in task performance, a direct comparison of neural activity during 
conscious and unconscious conditions risks revealing differences in the neural substrates of 
perception (and other behavioral and cognitive capacities) rather than, or in addition to, the 
neural substrates of consciousness. Consequently, matching performance is crucial in 
neuroimaging studies that compare neural activity across awareness conditions.  
In the following sections we discuss the benefits and challenges of matching 
performance in consciousness research. In Section 2, we discuss the difference between 
subjective and objective measures of consciousness, how they dissociate, and argue that 
consciousness research needs to focus on subjective measures while keeping objective 
performance constant. Then, in Section 3, we elaborate on the logic of considering task 
performance a confound in neuroimaging studies of consciousness. In Section 4, we discuss 
methods based on Signal Detection Theory and the design of stimuli specifically created to 
match performance and still obtain differences in awareness. In Section 5, we discuss 
potential technical and theoretical issues that stem from matching performance across 
conditions of awareness. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss future directions in consciousness 
research, and introduce the notion of “triangulation” for designing comprehensive 
experimental sets that can better reveal the neural substrates of consciousness.  
A note on terminology: unless otherwise specified, by “consciousness” we will refer 
specifically to phenomenal consciousness of visual contents as revealed by subjective reports 
in detection and discrimination tasks. The context should make clear whether we are 
discussing cases of all or nothing consciousness, or cases of relative levels of awareness.  
 
2. Subjective and Objective Measures of Consciousness 
 
To analyze neural data, experimenters need to know when subjects are conscious of the 
stimuli they are presented with and when they are not. A straightforward way to achieve this 
is by asking subjects to report their subjective state, e.g. “I saw the branch” or “I did not see 
a branch.” For obvious reasons, this kind of subjective measure is widely used. However, 
subjective measures have been criticized both in philosophy and neuroscience. From a 
behavioral standpoint, critics argue that introspective reports of consciousness are prone to 
mistakes, biases and response criterion effects (Irvine, 2012; Phillips, 2016; Schwitzgebel, 
2011; Spener, forthcoming). Subjects could report more or less frequently that they saw a 
stimulus due to their response strategies and not due to a reliable introspective judgment of 
their actual conscious experiences. By using objective measures that assess subjects’ ability 
to detect and discriminate stimuli independently of whether they take themselves to have 
seen them consciously or not, experimenters could bypass the problem of the response 
criterion and the fallibility of introspection. From a neuroscientific perspective, an additional 
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concern is that by eliciting subjective reports of consciousness, we risk capturing the neural 
correlates of the report of consciousness, instead of consciousness itself (Tsuchiya, Wilke, 
Frässle, & Lamme, 2015). To address this potential issue, critics have suggested using no-
report paradigms where subjects’ conscious status can be inferred by some indirect means 
other than direct subjective reports. 
In this section, we discuss—and reject—the use of objective measures; instead, we 
argue that objective and subjective measures can come apart: you may report to be 
subjectively unaware of a stimulus and yet your behavior demonstrates that you are 
objectively able to detect or discriminate it (and vice versa). In the next section, we address 
the neuroscientific objections against subjective reports and argue that task performance is 
a confound in neuroimaging studies of consciousness.  
 
Objective Measures 
To assess the objective performance of a subject during a visual task, one can compute the 
percentage of their correct responses. But percentage correct estimates do not disentangle 
perceptual sensitivity from response bias. A more sophisticated method is estimating 
subjects’ d’ (d prime), which is a measure of perceptual sensitivity that stems from Signal 
Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Importantly, one can 
estimate subjects’ objective perceptual capacity (i.e. their perceptual signal-to-noise ratio; e.g. 
their ability to discern whether a line is tilted left or right) independently from their response 
bias (e.g. their overall propensity for reporting “left tilt” or “right tilt”). According to 
proponents of objective measures of consciousness, subjects’ awareness of a stimulus can be 
equated with their perceptual sensitivity. Thus, if subjects do not perform a perceptual task 
above chance levels (i.e. d’=0), one could assume that they did not see the stimuli consciously 
(Holender, 1986; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007).  
Unfortunately, the use of objective measures ignores a fundamental aspect of 
consciousness—in fact, it ignores what makes it an interesting phenomenon in the first place: 
its subjective character. In normal scenarios, perceptual sensitivity may track consciousness. 
For example, objectively discriminating branches from a clear road might coincide with the 
subjective report of experiencing a branch and the subjective report of experiencing no debris, 
respectively. However, as we show below, objective and subjective measures can dissociate: 
one can perceptually discriminate stimuli without awareness, and one can enjoy conscious 
experiences without any perceptual sensitivity. During illusions or hallucinations, conscious 
experiences do not entail perceptual discrimination above chance—during a hallucination 
there is nothing to discriminate! Alternatively, above-chance discrimination does not entail 
consciousness. For instance, artificial systems can make successful discriminations of visual 
stimuli, but with the current state of technology it is unlikely they are conscious (Stanislas 
Dehaene, Lau, & Kouider, 2017). Moreover, blindsight patients deny being conscious of 
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perfectly visible stimuli presented in a blind region of their visual field, and yet, they are able 
to detect or discriminate these otherwise invisible stimuli significantly above chance. If we 
made d’ the measure of awareness, we would need to reject patients’ subjective reports. 
Rather than ignoring subjective reports, we should value them as an important window to 
awareness, which is distinct and dissociable from objective performance. 
 
Subjective Measures 
Subjective reports can be obtained using a wide variety of procedures, such as reports of 
awareness (e.g. “seen” vs “not seen” or “seen” vs “guess”, as in e.g. Lau & Passingham (2006)); 
reports on the visibility of the stimulus (e.g. from “clearly visible” to “not visible”, as in e.g. 
Sergent & Dehaene (2004)); the method of adjustment or comparative judgments between 
two stimuli, which allows estimation of the point of subjective equality (PSE) (e.g. “this 
stimulus is more visible than this other one”, as in e.g. Knotts, Lau, & Peters (2018)); reports 
of awareness using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) (0=no awareness, 1=brief glimpse, 
2=almost clear awareness, 3=clear awareness; (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004)); confidence 
ratings (e.g. 1=not confident, 2=barely confident, 3=somewhat confident, 4=very confident, 
as in e.g. Maniscalco & Lau (2012) or post-decision wagering (e.g. high vs low wager of points 
or money, as in e.g. Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey (2007)).  
Although there are important differences among these subjective methods, they all 
aim to probe the qualities of subjects’ conscious experiences. The first four methods require 
subjects to introspect and report on the nature of their experiences. Even though confidence 
ratings are more indirect, they are very commonly used in consciousness research. When 
asked to provide confidence ratings, subjects are asked about their subjective impression 
regarding their objective performance in the task. Despite being less direct, confidence 
ratings can provide similar insights into a subject's conscious experience as those given by 
direct introspective reports, while also potentially offering some advantages (but see 
Rosenthal (2019)). Empirically, confidence ratings often correlate with reports of subjective 
awareness (Michel, 2019; Peters & Lau, 2015; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & 
Cleeremans, 2010). This empirical correlation reflects the fact that one’s confidence in a 
visual task is largely shaped by one’s phenomenology. If one sees clearly what is on the 
screen, in general one should be more confident that one responded correctly about the 
stimulus presence/identity; alternatively, if one is not clearly aware of the stimulus, one 
should be less confident in the correctness of their response—it should feel more like guessing 
(see Rausch & Zehetleitner (2016)). One potential advantage of confidence ratings is that it 
might be easier for subjects to understand what is being asked from them when providing 
confidence ratings than when they are asked to introspect about the nature of their subjective 
experience. A second advantage is that  confidence ratings are more interpretable than 
awareness reports for assessing subjects’ metacognitive capacity which, however, can 
potentially offer a meaningful window into subjective conscious states.  
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Metacognition is the capacity to monitor and evaluate one’s own cognitive processes 
(Flavell, 1979; Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Proust, 2013). Confidence ratings can be 
viewed as metacognitive judgments about the likelihood that a given response in a task is 
correct. As a consequence, it is possible to compute “objective” measures of metacognitive 
performance from subjective confidence ratings by quantifying how well confidence correlates 
with accuracy. In particular, signal detection theory analyses can provide a response-bias-
free measure of metacognitive sensitivity analogous to d’, termed meta-d’ (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012, 2014). This “objective” and response-bias-free measure thus offers the tantalizing 
potential for having the best of both worlds when studying awareness: taking subjective 
report seriously (like subjective measures), while sidestepping thorny issues of response bias 
(like objective measures) (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 2001). However, it is possible for 
blindsight patients to have above-chance metacognitive performance in their blind field 
(Persaud et al., 2011), and conceptually it is possible to have chance-level metacognition 
about phenomenological experiences (e.g. due to hallucination; Shaver, Maniscalco, & Lau 
(2008)), suggesting that the presence or absence of metacognitive sensitivity cannot be taken 
as a hard and fast indicator of the presence or absence of phenomenology (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012). Nonetheless, measures of metacognitive sensitivity may have heuristic value in 
assessing levels of stimulus awareness, as presumably one’s metacognitive sensitivity would 
tend to dwindle with reductions in phenomenological stimulus awareness. For instance, 
Persaud et al. 2011 showed that although their blindsight patient had above-chance 
metacognitive performance in the blind field, this was still lower than metacognitive 
performance in the normally sighted field, in spite of the fact that visual task performance in 
the two fields was matched by stimulus titration.  
 
Objective and Subjective Measures Can Dissociate 
The idea that subjective and objective measures of consciousness can dissociate, and that 
their dissociation represents a unique opportunity to isolate the neural basis of conscious 
awareness, is not new. More than 20 years ago, Weiskrantz and colleagues (Weiskrantz, 
Barbur, & Sahraie, 1995) suggested that “blindsight” patients offer a stunning demonstration 
of how subjectivity and objectivity differ (Lau, 2008). Blindsight occurs when patients have 
damage to primary visual cortex (V1). These patients can perform many perceptual tasks at 
above-chance levels and yet report no phenomenological experience associated with this 
ability. In some patients, performance in the blind part of the visual field is as high as that 
of the unimpaired field, and phenomenological experience can be found in one, but not the 
other. Thus, blindsight patients provide a critical proof-of-principle in demonstrating how 
subjective and objective measures can dissociate within a single individual. 
 It is beyond the scope of the current work to exhaustively review the literature 
demonstrating the many ways in which objective and subjective measures can dissociate in 
healthy and atypical populations, although the examples of matched performance / different 
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awareness findings discussed below constitute one salient subset of such evidence. 
Importantly, the dissociability of objective and subjective measures entails not only that 
objective measures may be unreliable indicators of consciousness, but also that differences in 
objective performance associated with differences in awareness can pose as confounds that 
must be controlled for in isolating the cognitive and neural properties of consciousness. 
 
3. The Importance of Matching Task Performance  
 
Pre-conditions, Concurrent-processing, and Post-processing Effects  
An important challenge faced when trying to isolate the neural bases of consciousness is the 
need to distinguish, on one hand, the neural substrates of consciousness proper, and on the 
other hand, the pre- and post-processing that enable and follow conscious experiences, 
respectively (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012). Equally important is to distinguish 
the processing that occurs concurrently with conscious processes, but that is ultimately 
irrelevant for supporting them. As indicated above, the proper neural substrates of 
consciousness are only those that are jointly minimally sufficient for sustaining a conscious 
experience with a given content (Chalmers, 2000; Shoemaker, 1981). There is, however, a 
multitude of pre-, concurrent-, and post-processes that are not sufficient (or even necessary) 
for sustaining conscious experiences. Some of these might be necessary for perceptually 
processing the stimulus (albeit unconsciously). Perhaps they are even necessary for giving 
rise to the neural events that are in fact the basis of consciousness, without themselves being 
a neural correlate of consciousness. Crucially, these irrelevant processes need to be 
eliminated or matched across conscious and unconscious conditions.  
Consider comparing the neural activity of someone with their eyes open and then 
closed. They are more likely to consciously see a stimulus with their eyes open than with 
their eyes closed. However, comparing their neural states in these two conditions would 
hardly reveal the neural correlates of consciousness: so many other things are different! This 
extreme case illustrates what happens in more subtle scenarios where there are differences 
in pre-, concurrent-, and post-processing. For instance, consider the general excitability of 
neuronal populations. Oscillating pre-stimulus brain activity can reliably predict whether a 
subsequent stimulus is perceived or not (Benwell et al., 2017; Mathewson, Gratton, Fabiani, 
Beck, & Ro, 2009; Samaha, Iemi, & Postle, 2017). When contrasting conscious and 
unconscious trials, these differences in neural activity are likely to be reflected in 
neuroimaging data (specifically, in the phase of pre-stimulus alpha oscillations obtained in 
electroencephalography—EEG). However, these enabling pre-stimulus oscillations are not 
the neural substrate of consciousness.  
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Consider now post-processing. Consciously experiencing a stimulus is likely to have 
ripple effects in subsequent neural processing that are either lacking or reduced during 
unconscious perception. Some of these might be cognitive consequences that are not 
associated with consciousness at all (Block, 2019). For example, sustained maintenance of 
information in working memory, access to long-term memory, verbal reports, or intentional 
behavior are examples of post-perceptual processing that could be more markedly revealed 
in neural activity during conscious trials compared to unconscious trials. This post-processing 
neural activity, however, is not the neural substrate of consciousness proper as it only 
happens after consciousness has already started taking place (and of course it can overlap 
with continuing conscious processing).  
This concern has led some researchers to argue that we need to eliminate subjective 
reports from consciousness research altogether (Tsuchiya et al., 2015). They worry that 
requiring subjective reports might reveal just post-processing neural activity associated with 
access and report itself, but not consciousness. However, it is important to curb these specific 
worries about subjective reports and highlight an important constraint: processing unrelated 
to consciousness is problematic when it is not matched across conditions. As long as subjects 
have similar cognitive and reporting requirements across conscious and unconscious trials, 
subjective reports need not be a confound (Michel & Morales, 2019).  
Concurrent-processing of the stimulus (e.g. perceptual processing independent from 
consciousness such as distinguishing signal from noise, feature extraction, categorization, 
etc.), which is fundamental for performing the task successfully, takes place alongside 
processes supporting consciousness. But those perceptual processes are not part of the neural 
basis of consciousness since, presumably, these are perceptual processes that are also present 
during unconscious perception. 
One might wonder, is there any neural activity left over? One important lesson from 
thinking about the importance of matching background conditions and cognitive processes 
across conditions of awareness is that the neural activity that supports consciousness may 
indeed be quite subtle. For instance, it might only be detectable with highly sensitive 
neuroimaging methods such as single-cell recording, sophisticated statistical methods such 
as multivariate (rather than univariate) analyses, and in localized rather than brain-wide 
activity (Morales & Lau, forthcoming). So, when pre-, concurrent-, and post-processes are not 
matched across conditions, experimenters risk conflating them with the neural substrates of 
consciousness proper. Unfortunately, while these differences might be conceptually clear, in 
practice it can be challenging to distill all these types of neural activity (Giles, Lau, & 
Odegaard, 2016). Part of the difficulty is that there is no clear temporal differentiation 
between relevant and irrelevant types of neural activity for consciousness. Activity related to 
pre-conditions could continue after stimulus presentation when neural activity related to 
consciousness begins. Similarly, the consequences of conscious awareness could begin to 
manifest while subjects are still aware of the stimulus, effectively creating temporally 
overlapping neural activity pertaining to distinct processes. Naturally, concurrent processes 
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are especially hard to disentangle from conscious-related processes. Moreover, nothing we 
know about neurobiology rules out a priori that some pre-, concurrent-, and post-processing 
recruit at least a subset of the same neuronal populations recruited by consciousness 
processes. 
An effective way to eliminate, or at least reduce, these confounds is to match the 
testing conditions across conscious and unconscious trials. As long as the pre-conditions, 
concurrent-processes, and post-effects of consciousness are sufficiently similar across 
conscious and unconscious trials, one may not need to worry about distilling them from the 
neural data pertaining to consciousness proper. This is because there is a reasonable 
expectation that they will cancel each other out. Some of the dimensions along which tasks 
are often matched include type, duration and strength of stimulation, response demands (e.g. 
sensorimotor and cognitive requirements for report), and cognitive demands (e.g. attention, 
working memory load, task difficulty, cognitive control, etc.). However, an important, yet 
often neglected, dimension that experimenters should match across conscious and 
unconscious trials is task performance.  
 
Performance Matching is Key 
Matching subjects’ performance in conscious and unconscious trials ensures that concurrent 
perceptual signal processing is comparable. This is important both in itself and because it 
helps matching other types of processing. For instance, similarity in perceptual processing 
increases the odds that pre- and post-processing neural activity is comparable. If one wants 
to find the neural basis of consciousness proper, and distinguish it from the objective capacity 
to perceive a stimulus, performance matching is required. But it is also important because it 
correlates with other cognitive capacities. Whereas task performance can be 
straightforwardly computed (e.g. percentage of correct trials or d’), it is hard to objectively 
quantify cognitive processes such as cognitive effort, working memory load (beyond number 
of items to be reported), and so on. But matching these cognitive demands is important. By 
making sure that task performance is the same across conditions, we ensure that cognitive 
effort, working memory load, and other cognitive demands are similar as well. 
While conceptually matching performance is desirable, it is hard to achieve in practice 
and it is in all likelihood impossible to achieve without creating differences somewhere else 
(see Section 6). To make someone unaware of an otherwise visible stimulus, some change in 
the testing conditions needs to take place (Kim & Blake, 2005). These changes can be applied 
to the stimulus itself (e.g. decreasing stimulus strength or duration, adding a mask or 
changing the mask’s duration), to the task (e.g. increasing task difficulty), or to participants 
themselves (e.g. distracting participants’ attention, altering their brain states directly via 
TMS).  
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It is important to emphasize that the goal of performance matching is to match 
perceptual signal processing; in other words, perceivers’ capacity to process the perceptual 
signal triggered in their visual system such that it can disentangle signal from noise and 
eventually create a perceptual representation of the stimulus. To illustrate this point, 
consider the following case. Imagine an experiment where subjects detect stimuli correctly 
more frequently when they are conscious of them than when they are not—i.e. an experiment 
where performance, and hence perceptual signal processing, are not matched across 
conscious and unconscious trials. To fix this, one could try to “artificially match” for 
performance a posteriori by only analyzing the neural data of “correct” trials, leaving out 
“incorrect” trials. This way, performance in the selected trials would be, by necessity, 
matched at 100% in both cases. But this artificial correction would not necessarily match the 
perceptual signal processing capacity and its supporting brain states across different 
awareness conditions. For instance, in unaware trials in which subjects reported correctly, 
they could have guessed without perceptually processing the stimulus. One could attempt 
more sophisticated corrections to “guesses” in unaware trials by taking into account subjects’ 
guessing rate (Lamy, Salti, & Bar-Haim, 2009). But this approach is insufficient for matching 
the underlying perceptual capacity and the corresponding neural activity that drives correct 
trials in aware and unaware conditions (Morales, Chiang, & Lau, 2015). Thus, artificial 
matching should be avoided. 
 
Performance Matching Reveals Neural Correlates of Consciousness in PFC, in 
Agreement with Higher-Order Theories 
One seminal demonstration of performance matching comes in a metacontrast masking study 
by Lau & Passingham (2006). In their behavioral experiment, subjects were presented with 
a brief visual target and were required to discriminate its identity (either diamond or square) 
and indicate whether they consciously saw the target or not. Critically, a metacontrast mask 
was presented with varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) after the visual target. 
Behavioral results showed that two distinct SOAs yielded similar levels of performance on 
the discrimination task, but different levels of awareness (the percentage of trials subjects 
reported seeing the stimulus). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed that 
while activations in many cortical areas distinguished performance levels in general (i.e. 
correct vs. incorrect trials), only dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activity reflected 
differences in two SOA conditions with matched performance and different awareness.  
Maniscalco & Lau (2016) replicated the behavioral effect and conducted a model 
comparison analysis to test the ability of various candidate theories to capture the data. They 
found that the data were best captured by models embodying principles of higher-order 
theories of consciousness (Brown, Lau, & LeDoux, 2019; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), in which 
task performance is determined by “first-order” processing and conscious awareness is 
determined by subsequent “higher-order” processing that evaluates first-order processing. 
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Lau & Passingham’s finding that performance-matched differences in awareness are 
associated with activity in DLPFC but not sensory cortices can be well accommodated by 
higher-order theory given the broad observation that various forms of first-order processing 
tend to occur in posterior sensory cortices, whereas higher-order processing is more localized 
to prefrontal cortex (Brown et al., 2019). 
The special role of prefrontal cortex in supporting subjective awareness, 
independently of objective task performance, is supported by a number of other studies. 
Disruption of DLPFC function by TMS (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 
2010; Ruby, Maniscalco, & Peters, 2018) or concurrent task demands (Maniscalco & Lau, 
2015) selectively impairs metacognitive sensitivity but not objective performance in 
perceptual tasks. Patients with anterior prefrontal cortex lesions exhibit selective 
impairment of metacognitive sensitivity on a perceptual task relative to temporal lobe 
patients and healthy controls, even when task performance is matched across groups 
(Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014). In a blindsight patient, frontoparietal areas in 
the brain are more activated for stimulus perception in the healthy visual field than in the 
blind visual field, even when task performance across the fields is equated (Persaud et al., 
2011). Metacognitive sensitivity and task performance dissociate over time as one 
continuously performs a demanding task without rest, and this dissociation can be accounted 
for by individual differences in grey matter volume in anterior prefrontal cortex (Maniscalco, 
McCurdy, Odegaard, & Lau, 2017). Higher prestimulus activity in the dorsal attention 
network is associated with lower confidence ratings but not altered task accuracy (Rahnev, 
Bahdo, de Lange, & Lau, 2012). Further examples of matched performance with different 
awareness are discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Understanding and Designing Matched Performance, 
Different Awareness Stimuli with Signal Detection Theory 
 
A general principle that has been employed to both explain and generate matched 
performance with different awareness data is that task performance depends on signal-to-
noise ratio, whereas awareness often depends more so on absolute levels of perceptual 
evidence. For instance, imagine a simple signal detection theory model in which two stimulus 
classes, S1 and S2, generate normal distributions of perceptual evidence along a decision axis 
(Fig. 1A), such that the perceptual evidence elicited by presentation of a stimulus on a given 
trial is a random draw from the corresponding evidence distribution. Suppose that in 
condition A (Fig. 1A, top panel), the S1 and S2 distributions have means at the decision axis 
values −1 and +1, respectively, and standard deviations of 1. The subject responds “S2” if the 
evidence value e on the current trial exceeds 0, and endorses classification responses with 
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high confidence if e<−2 or e>2 (corresponding to strong evidence for S1 or S2, respectively). 
Now suppose that in condition B (Fig. 1A, bottom panel), the S1 and S2 distributions have 
means of −2 and +2, and standard deviations of 2, but that the subject’s decision rules for 
classifying and rating confidence remain the same. Conditions A and B then have identical 
task performance due to having identical signal-to-noise ratio; in both cases, the means of 
the evidence distributions are two standard deviations apart (i.e. d’=2), meaning it is equally 
difficult to infer whether a given perceptual sample originated from S1 or S2. However, 
confidence is higher in condition B, since in this case the absolute levels of perceptual 
evidence are more extreme and therefore more frequently exceed the criteria for high 
confidence. In this way, provided that the subject uses the same decision strategy across 
conditions2, higher absolute levels of evidence will cause higher confidence even for matched 
signal-to-noise ratios.  
 
 
Figure 1. Explaining matched performance, different awareness with one-
dimensional and two-dimensional signal detection theory. (A) In the one-dimensional 
case, consider a scenario where a subject needs to decide whether a given evidence sample on 
the decision axis was drawn from class S1 (gray distribution) or S2 (black) and rate confidence. 
The discrimination judgment depends on whether the given sample drawn is above or below a 
decision criterion, which in this example is set at 0 (solid line). If the sample is below 0, the 
subject selects S1, and if the sample is above 0, the subject selects S2. The rating of low or high 
confidence depends on where the sample falls with respect to the confidence criteria (dotted 
lines). In this example, samples greater than 2 or less than -2 yield high confidence ratings, 
while samples within this range yield low confidence. It follows that in the bottom panel, 
average confidence is higher due to higher evidence variance, in spite of task performance 
(signal-to-noise ratio, d’) being the same as in the top panel. (B) In the two-dimensional case, 
the two axes represent evidence for each stimulus class (eS1 and eS2). Circles represent 
bivariate normal distributions, and samples drawn from these distributions thereby contain 
                                               
2 Note that experimental designs in which conditions are randomly interleaved across trials can help 
ensure that decision strategy is constant across conditions, since human subjects have difficulty 
dynamically adjusting response criteria from trial to trial even when it would be ideal to do so (Brown 
& Steyvers, 2005; Gorea & Sagi, 2000). 
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evidence for both eS1 and eS2. Thus, the means of these distributions represent various 
positive evidence (PE) / negative evidence (NE) levels. Discriminating whether the stimulus is 
S1 or S2 involves evaluating whether the sample falls above or below the solid diagonal line. 
Confidence, however, involves evaluating the magnitude of the response-congruent evidence, 
which is shown by the confidence criteria (dashed lines) separating the white and gray regions. 
In this example, the high PE / NE stimuli (solid circles) have higher confidence than the low 
PE / NE stimuli (dotted circles) due to having more probability mass exceeding the confidence 
criteria, in spite of task performance (distance between the means of the distributions divided 
by standard deviation, d’) being the same. 
 
 This mechanism has successfully modeled performance-matched differences in 
awareness due to attentional manipulations (Rahnev et al., 2011), as well as simultaneous 
decreases in task performance and increases in confidence caused by TMS (Rahnev, 
Maniscalco, Luber, Lau, & Lisanby, 2012). It has also generated novel matched performance, 
different awareness findings by informing the experimental design of stimuli. For instance, 
experiments 1B and 2B of (Koizumi, Maniscalco, & Lau, 2015) used random dot motion 
stimuli in which a subset of dots moved coherently left or right, and the rest moved randomly. 
Across conditions, the fraction of coherently moving dots (i.e. signal-to-noise ratio) was the 
same, but the overall number of dots (i.e. absolute levels of perceptual evidence) differed. As 
expected, confidence was higher for stimuli with higher dot density, even though task 
performance was the same. (Samaha, Barrett, Sheldon, LaRocque, & Postle, 2016; Samaha, 
Switzky, & Postle, 2019) used oriented gratings in noise as stimuli and employed similar 
manipulations of the stimuli. Across conditions, the ratio of grating contrast to noise contrast 
was identical, but overall contrast of the composite stimulus differed, yielding higher 
confidence in the higher contrast stimuli despite equivalent performance. 
A similar principle and accompanying method of stimulus construction comes from 
findings that confidence follows a response-congruent evidence rule. That is, confidence 
depends heavily on evidence congruent with the perceptual decision while downweighting or 
ignoring evidence that contradicts the perceptual decision (Zylberberg et al. 2012; Maniscalco 
et al. 2016; Peters et al. 2017). Exploiting this finding, experiments 1A and 2A of Koizumi et 
al. (2015) used stimuli with different levels of positive evidence (PE) and negative evidence 
(NE), where PE is evidence supporting the correct perceptual decision and NE is evidence 
supporting the incorrect decision. Specifically, they used oriented gratings embedded in 
noise, where a higher-contrast grating (PE) tilted left or right was superimposed with a lower-
contrast grating (NE) tilted in the opposite direction, and the correct tilt response 
corresponded to the higher-contrast grating. By manipulating the contrasts of PE, NE, and 
noise, they created conditions where performance was similar but PE and NE levels differed. 
Crucially, since confidence depends on response-congruent evidence, confidence was higher 
in the conditions with higher PE and NE levels.  
An illustration of the logic of capitalizing on the response-congruent evidence rule to 
create matched performance, different awareness stimuli by manipulating PE and NE levels 
 16 
is shown in Figure 1B. Following Maniscalco, Peters, & Lau (2016), we use a two-dimensional 
signal detection theory representation in which the two axes, eS1 and eS2, correspond to 
evidence for the two stimulus classes S1 and S2. Generalizing from the one-dimensional case 
(Figure 1A), we assume that each stimulus class generates a bivariate normal distribution, 
such that the perceptual evidence elicited by a stimulus on a given trial is a random draw of 
an (eS1, eS2) pair from the corresponding stimulus distribution. Circles in the plot represent 
contours of the distributions as 3D hills seen from above, similar to a topographic map. The 
mean of the distributions corresponds to PE and NE levels; for instance, an S1 stimulus with 
high PE and intermediate NE will have a high mean value along the eS1 dimension and an 
intermediate mean value along the eS2 dimension. Given evidence (eS1, eS2) on a given trial, 
the subject responds “S2” if eS2>eS1 (region of the plot below the solid diagonal line 
eS1=eS2), and “S1” otherwise. Crucially, the subject rates confidence by comparing the 
magnitude of response-congruent evidence to a criterion value (corresponding to the dashed 
horizontal and vertical lines), yielding high confidence for evidence pairs located in the 
shaded region of the plot. 
In Figure 1B, we show stimulus distributions for two experimental conditions, one 
with low PE and NE, and one with high PE and NE. Task performance (d’) is determined by 
the distance between the distributions along the line connecting their means, divided by their 
common standard deviation. Thus, the low and high PE/NE conditions shown here have 
matched levels of d’. However, a greater proportion of the high PE/NE distributions lies 
within the shaded region of the plot than the low PE/NE distributions, thus yielding higher 
confidence. Note that this arrangement depends on the response-congruent evidence rule in 
order to yield differences in confidence; if confidence depended on the magnitude of the 
difference in evidence eS2−eS1, then the dashed confidence criterion lines would be 45 
degrees (parallel to the solid perceptual decision criterion), and the proportion of the 
distributions lying in the shaded (high confidence) regions would be equivalent for the high 
and low PE/NE stimuli.  
Notably, the PE/NE method of creating stimuli yielding matched performance and 
different awareness has the advantage that it allows for overall stimulus energy (e.g. contrast 
or dot density) to be matched across conditions, since increases in PE and NE energy can be 
offset by decreases in noise energy. By contrast, the signal/noise method requires there to be 
higher overall stimulus energy in the condition with higher awareness, thus posing an 
undesirable confound. On the other hand, PE/NE manipulations potentially induce response 
conflict in a way that signal/noise manipulations don't (by virtue of PE and NE priming 
opposing perceptual decisions / responses), which can also be undesirable.  
Note that the mechanisms discussed in this section are not meant to be exhaustive 
explanations for all cases; it is possible that other kinds of mechanisms can also produce 
matched performance, different awareness data, such as the higher-order model of 
Maniscalco & Lau (2016) mentioned previously. Nonetheless, the methods discussed in this 
section are powerful insofar as they not only provide potential post-hoc explanations, but 
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actually enable us to design stimuli that yield matched performance and different awareness 
using well-understood computational principles. 
 
5. Theoretical Caveats and Nuances 
 
We can summarize the logic of performance matching as follows: to precisely isolate 
subjective awareness of a stimulus from confounding factors, we should conduct experiments 
that satisfy the following criteria: 
 
1. Dissociable processing identified: We have some notion of which sensory and 
perceptual processing of the stimulus is dissociable from awareness and thus needs to 
be controlled for when experimentally isolating awareness 
2. Dissociable processes matched: We empirically confirm that the dissociable 
processing identified in (1) is matched across experimental conditions by 
demonstrating equal performance on a task that probes such processing 
3. Awareness differs: Average subjective awareness of the stimulus differs across 
conditions 
 
 Here we highlight some nuances and potential difficulties in each of these criteria that 
should inform the way we conduct and interpret performance matching studies and the study 
of subjective awareness more broadly. In brief, the nuances explored for each criterion are: 
 
1. Uncertainty about dissociable processing: There is some uncertainty about 
which perceptual processing is dissociable from awareness and which is not 
2. Multidimensionality of dissociable processing: There are potentially many 
dimensions of stimulus processing that are dissociable from awareness other than the 
task probed in the experiment 
3. Absolute vs relative levels of awareness: Interpreting a difference in awareness 
requires considering not just the relative difference in reported awareness across 
conditions, but also the absolute level of awareness within each condition 
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Uncertainty about Dissociable Processing 
In order to argue that we should control for some aspect of perceptual processing P when 
studying awareness, we must have some prior reason for thinking that P is dissociable from 
awareness to begin with. For instance, we have strong reason to believe that forced-choice 
discrimination of simple stimulus features can proceed without awareness from blindsight 
patients (Weiskrantz, 1986). There is also evidence for above-chance forced-choice stimulus 
discrimination in healthy observers (e.g. Kouider, Dehaene, Jobert, & Le Bihan, 2007; 
Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004), although such 
findings are more contentious (Eriksen, 1960; Hannula, Simons, & Cohen, 2005; Lloyd, 
Abrahamyan, & Harris, 2013; Peters & Lau, 2015; Phillips, 2016). And of course, as reviewed 
above, there is ample evidence that awareness can differ across conditions with matched 
forced-choice discrimination performance. 
 Stances on what aspects of stimulus processing are dissociable from awareness, 
versus which are inseparable from or deeply intertwined with it, are influenced not just by 
evidence but also theory. For instance, some theoretical frameworks—such as higher order 
theories (Brown et al., 2019; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011) and some interpretations or 
implementations of signal detection theory (Maniscalco et al., 2016)—lend themselves 
naturally to viewing task performance and subjective reports of awareness as strongly 
dissociable, whereas other frameworks posit a tighter relationship in which cleanly 
separating task performance and awareness might not always be so straightforward. For 
instance, in Global Workspace theory (e.g. Baars, 2005; Baars, 1997; Dehaene, 2014), a 
content becomes conscious by virtue of entering a “global workspace,” but also enjoys 
enhanced processing by virtue of being in the workspace, such that the enhanced processing 
of the content may not be completely separable from awareness of the content per se. 
Importantly, these theoretical orientations affect not just predictions about what sorts 
of stimulus processing should be dissociable from awareness, but also interpretation of extant 
demonstrations of such dissociations. For instance, for a higher-order theorist, matched 
performance dissociations are straightforward demonstrations of the theoretically expected 
separability of task performance and awareness. By contrast, a global workspace theorist 
might hold that even though feature discrimination and stimulus awareness are partially 
dissociable, nonetheless awareness of a stimulus plays some direct participatory role in the 
full-blown kind of feature discrimination present in conditions of full stimulus awareness. 
(An instance of such a view is the model of Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 
2009.) For such a theorist, matching discrimination performance when studying awareness 
might eliminate too much, removing the confounds of non-conscious contributions to feature 
discrimination while also masking the contributions of consciousness itself, leaving only some 
minimal difference in awareness that happens to be insufficient to manifest as a difference 
in task performance. 
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More generally, to whatever extent awareness directly participates in some aspect of 
perceptual processing P, that aspect of awareness must necessarily be masked by 
experimental procedures that match P across conditions. Demonstrating that awareness can 
differ to some extent when P is matched does not necessarily entail that awareness plays no 
part in P whatsoever; it only conclusively demonstrates that in some conditions, it is possible 
for the observed difference in awareness to fail to manifest as a difference in P. 
There is thus a kind of circularity that poses some difficulty for different theoretical 
camps to agree on basic aspects of methodology in consciousness science: our theories should 
be constrained by empirical results, but the interpretation of those results and how they 
should refine our theories is itself theory-dependent. Continued advances in empirical 
findings and theoretical developments will presumably lead to increasing convergence on 
both theory and methodology, but achieving such convergence is nontrivial in the face of these 
issues. 
 
Multidimensionality of Dissociable Processing 
To this point, we have focused the discussion on matching task performance for the task being 
probed in the experimental design. For instance, if the task requires the subject to 
discriminate left vs right grating tilt and then report awareness, we would recommend to 
study awareness by comparing two experimental conditions where tilt discrimination 
performance is equal and yet average subjective report differs. However, it is of course the 
case that the subject performs many other perceptual operations (“tasks”) that are not 
directly probed by such a design, e.g. detecting the presence of the grating, identifying the 
detected stimulus as an oriented grating, discerning the exact degree of its tilt (as opposed to 
making a binary left / right classification), etc. 
We can therefore differentiate between probed task performance (performance on the 
task explicitly measured in the experiment, e.g. tilt discrimination) and latent task 
performance (performance on perceptual “tasks” that were not explicitly probed in the 
experiment but could have been, e.g. stimulus detection, object identification, etc.). The 
question then becomes whether matching probed task performance is sufficient for matching 
latent task performance. Presumably, as general quality of stimulus processing improves (e.g. 
due to stronger stimulus drive, improved attention, etc.), different dimensions of perceptual 
processing (detection, feature discrimination, identification, etc.) will all improve as well. The 
existence of such a correlation in perceptual performance across different dimensions of 
stimulus processing helps address concerns about possible confounds in latent task 
performance when probed task performance is matched. Yet, there is no general guarantee 
that matching performance on the probed task entails matching performance on all latent 
tasks. For instance, it can be readily demonstrated with a signal detection theory model that 
identical levels of performance for discriminating between stimuli A and B are compatible 
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with different levels of performance for detecting A and B. For instance, by increasing the 
means and variances of the evidence distributions appropriately, d’ can remain unchanged 
(as in Fig. 1A), but such increases in mean and variance will yield altered detection 
performance with respect to a stimulus-absent noise distribution with fixed mean and 
variance. 
Of course, it is impossible in practice to probe all relevant kinds of perceptual 
processing in a single experiment, and so a pragmatic approach is just to match performance 
on a representative task (such as feature discrimination) and assume that this does an 
acceptable job of matching latent task performance. However, it is worth keeping in mind 
that the same logic that would lead us to worry about matching probed task performance 
should also lead us to worry about matching latent task performance. If latent task 
performance is not matched, then between-condition differences in behavior or neural 
activity could potentially be attributed to the difference in a “latent task” rather than the 
difference in awareness per se. Additionally, it is possible that in some situations we might 
have reasons to believe that some aspect of latent performance is not matched in spite of 
matched performance on the probed task, and such situations would require special care (e.g. 
caution in interpreting the results, or designing a new study that properly controls for the 
task performance in question). 
 
Absolute Levels of Awareness 
Not all differences in awareness are created equal. For instance, imagine an experiment 
where subjects use the perceptual awareness scale (PAS) (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004), a 
standardized scale for rating visual awareness with four levels: no awareness (PAS rating=0), 
brief glimpse (rating=1), almost clear awareness (rating = 2), and clear awareness (rating=3). 
A performance-matched difference in PAS levels of 0 (no reported awareness whatsoever) and 
1 (the first hints of entry of the stimulus into awareness) would then indicate something very 
different from a difference in PAS levels of 2 (almost clear awareness) and 3 (clear 
awareness). In turn, this would have consequences for interpreting the performance-matched 
difference in awareness in terms of cognitive functions or neural mechanisms. An experiment 
achieving a performance-matched difference of PAS rating=0 vs 1 would allow inferences 
about what cognitive functions and neural mechanisms correspond to the transition of a 
stimulus representation from complete unconsciousness to the first faint entries into 
conscious awareness3. By contrast, an experiment achieving a performance-matched 
difference of PAS rating=2 vs 3 would not allow inferences about the functions and 
mechanisms of a representation’s being conscious as such, but rather would be limited to 
                                               
3 For simplicity, here we bracket legitimate concerns about response biases that complicate taking 
such reports at face value.  
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inferences about the cognitive functions and neural mechanisms corresponding to increases 
in the relative intensity or clarity of contents that are already conscious. (For a related 
discussion, see Michel, 2019.) 
 Studies on awareness are often centrally interested in the cognitive functions and 
neural mechanisms of a stimulus representation being conscious as such. In principle, the 
ideal way to approach this research question from a performance-matching perspective would 
be to achieve performance-matching for a “completely unconscious” condition4 (i.e. PAS=0) 
and a “somewhat conscious” condition (PAS > 0). In practice, performance matching studies 
to this point have typically compared conditions in which subjects report an intermediate 
level of stimulus awareness in both conditions (Koizumi et al., 2015; Lau & Passingham, 
2006; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Samaha et al., 2016), making them ideally suited to 
investigating the relative degree of intensity or clarity of contents of awareness, rather than 
awareness per se.5 It has furthermore been difficult to unambiguously demonstrate above-
chance performance without awareness in healthy subjects (Eriksen, 1960; Hannula et al., 
2005; Lloyd et al., 2013; Peters & Lau, 2015). Thus, using the performance-matching 
framework to study the cognitive functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness as such, 
as opposed to the functions and mechanisms of changes in intensity or clarity of contents that 
are already conscious, faces significant practical hurdles still in need of addressing in future 
work. 
 Another way in which the absolute levels of awareness in performance-matched 
conditions matter is in interpreting the potential role of awareness in supporting further 
cognitive functions. For instance, (Koizumi et al., 2015) used specially designed grating 
stimuli to yield performance-matched differences in confidence for discriminating grating tilt. 
Confidence was rated on a scale of 1 to 4. Across two levels of d’ for tilt discrimination, mean 
confidence for the low and high confidence stimuli was about (low=2, high=2.3) and (low=2.3, 
high=2.5) respectively. Koizumi et al. then used the tilt of the performance-matched stimuli 
as cues in go/no-go and task set preparation tasks to probe the role of performance-matched 
differences in confidence on cognitive control. They found that higher confidence did not 
confer an advantage in either cognitive control task. As with any null effect, this finding 
needs to be interpreted with caution; failure to find an effect could be due to a true absence 
of an effect (Figure 2A), or failure to detect a true but weak effect (Figure 2B).  
In addition to these possibilities, it is also possible that failure to find an effect reflects 
a ceiling effect (Figure 2C) or floor effect (Figure 2D) attributable to the absolute levels of 
confidence probed in this study. For instance, it is possible that increases in performance-
matched confidence do increase cognitive control, but that this effect is most pronounced at 
                                               
4 Again, bracketing response bias concerns. 
5 Such concerns could be somewhat alleviated if it could be demonstrated that the difference in average 
awareness is driven strongly by different frequencies of “completely unconscious” or PAS=0 trials.  
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lower levels of confidence (confidence<2) and is already saturated for the levels of confidence 
probed in Koizumi et al. (confidence>2) (Figure 2C). Alternatively, it could be that 
performance-matched increases in confidence only manifest as increases in cognitive control 




Figure 2. Possible ways in which performance-matched differences in awareness 
could fail to yield differences on a secondary task. Plots show confidence on the x-axes, 
with the idealized assumption that these levels of confidence are all achieved at a constant 
level of primary task performance. Plotted on the y-axes are performance on a secondary task 
(such as the cognitive control task in Koizumi et al. 2015) using the matched performance, 
different awareness stimuli (e.g. using grating tilt to inform task set preparation for a 
separate, upcoming task). Vertical lines indicate two levels of performance-matched confidence 
probed in a hypothetical experiment, and horizontal lines show the corresponding difference 
in the secondary task under different scenarios. (A) No effect: performance-matched confidence 
does not affect the secondary task. (B) Weak effect: the influence of performance-matched 
confidence is small and therefore difficult to detect in an experiment. (C) Ceiling effect: 
performance-matched confidence does influence the secondary task, but the effect is saturated 
at the levels of confidence probed in the experiment. (D) Floor effect: performance-matched 
confidence does influence the secondary task, but the effect is stronger at higher levels of 
confidence than those probed in the experiment. 
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6. Future Directions: Triangulating on Consciousness 
 
We have argued that task performance is a serious yet underappreciated confound in the 
neuroscientific study of consciousness. Yet, even if we can find conditions yielding different 
levels of stimulus awareness while task performance is matched—and even if we 
satisfactorily address the caveats and nuances discussed in the previous section—the 
unfortunate fact remains that some confound in the comparison between the “more conscious” 
and “less conscious” conditions must be present. Namely, there must be some difference 
between the conditions that causes awareness to differ, whether it is a difference in stimulus 
properties, attention, brain stimulation, or some other factor.  
In practice, stimulus confounds are the type of confound most likely to be salient for 
performance matching studies. The “matched signal-to-noise ratio, different variance” 
method for designing performance-matched stimuli discussed previously (Fig. 1A) requires 
energy in the signal, noise, and overall stimulus to be larger in the “more conscious” 
condition. The “positive evidence / negative evidence” method (Fig. 1B) allows for overall 
stimulus energy to be matched, but only if energy in stimulus noise in the “conscious” 
condition is reduced to compensate for the increases in the energy of positive and negative 
evidence necessary to yield higher levels of awareness (Koizumi et al. 2015). These stimulus 
confounds are more severe than is typically encountered in more traditional consciousness 
experiments, where stimulus confounds are frequently minimal (e.g. differences in the 
temporal gap between stimulus and mask on the order of tens of milliseconds, as in Dehaene 
et al., 2001) or non-existent (e.g. a fixed stimulus repeatedly presented at threshold contrast 
so that it is sometimes consciously experienced and other times not, as in Baria, Maniscalco, 
& He, 2017).  
Yet, of course, these studies invoking minimal or no stimulus confound suffer from 
drastic performance confounds. (A notable exception here is the metacontrast masking 
paradigm employed in Lau & Passingham (2006) and Maniscalco & Lau (2016), which can 
achieve performance matching with a difference in stimulus-mask onset asynchrony on the 
order of tens of milliseconds.) One can argue that it is preferable to have stimulus confounds 
than performance confounds, as the latter presumably affect brain dynamics in a more global 
and complex way. However, significant stimulus confounds are clearly also undesirable. 
Indeed, if any method of generating a difference in consciousness across experimental 
conditions must be contaminated with some confounding factor or other, it would seem that 
there may be no single experimental design that could reveal the “pure,” uncontaminated 
neural substrates of consciousness. However, a possible way forward is to triangulate on 
these substrates by combining the results from multiple experimental designs with disjoint 
sets of confounds into one overarching analysis, rather than counting on any one given design 
being the silver bullet. A simple illustration of the idea is as follows: if experimental design 
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A matches for stimulus properties but suffers from performance confounds, and design B 
matches for performance but suffers from stimulus confounds, then perhaps analysis of the 
combined data could reveal the common subset of neural activity that correlates with 
consciousness in both experiments. In the idealized case, this common subset of neural 
activity would be confound-free, since the confounds in design A that co-vary with 
consciousness are completely absent in design B, and vice versa. In other words, such an 
analysis approach could potentially reveal the “pure” neural basis of consciousness. In 
practice, the triangulation approach faces significant challenges, not the least of which is the 
possibility that the neural substrate of consciousness might interact with different 
confounding factors in distinct and non-linear ways, thus complicating the distillation of the 
“pure” substrate of consciousness across experiments. Nonetheless, we regard the general 




We have presented theoretical considerations for why it is crucial to control for task 
performance confounds in the neuroscientific study of consciousness. The feasibility and 
value of this approach is demonstrated by a growing body of literature in which performance-
matched differences in awareness have been successfully isolated and computationally 
modeled. However, the performance-matching approach comes with a number of caveats and 
nuances that require careful consideration. A promising way forward may be to combine 
performance-matching approaches with other, complementary approaches so as to 
triangulate on the “pure,” confound-free neural substrate of consciousness. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank for their comments on a previous version of this chapter Rachel Denison, J.D. Knotts, 
Enoch Lambert, Hakwan Lau, Anna Leshinskaya, Matthias Michel, Ian Phillips, Jason Samaha, 
the editors Felipe de Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and participants at the 2019 





Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2012). Distilling the neural correlates of conscious-
ness. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 36(2), 737–746. 
Baars, B. J. (1997). In the theatre of consciousness. Global Workspace Theory, a rigorous scientific 
theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4(4), 292–309. 
Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of hu-
man experience. In Steven Laureys (Ed.), Progress in Brain Research (Vol. 150, pp. 45–53). Else-
vier. 
Baria, A. T., Maniscalco, B., & He, B. J. (2017). Initial-state-dependent, robust, transient neural dy-
namics encode conscious visual perception. PLoS Computational Biology, 13(11), e1005806. 
Bayne, T., Hohwy, J., & Owen, A. M. (2016). Are There Levels of Consciousness? Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 20(6), 405–413. 
Benwell, C. S. Y., Tagliabue, C. F., Veniero, D., Cecere, R., Savazzi, S., & Thut, G. (2017). Prestimulus 
EEG Power Predicts Conscious Awareness But Not Objective Visual Performance. eNeuro, 4(6). 
https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0182-17.2017 
Bickle, J. (2008). Real Reduction in Real Neuroscience: Metascience, Not Philosophy of Science (and 
Certainly Not Metaphysics!). In J. Hohwy & J. Kallestrup (Eds.), Being Reduced (pp. 34–51). 
Oxford University Press. 
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
18(2), 227–247. 
Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(2), 46–52. 
Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. 
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(5-6), 481–499; discussion 499–548. 
Block, N. (2011). Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
15(12), 567–575. 
Block, N. (2019). What Is Wrong with the No-Report Paradigm and How to Fix It. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.001 
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019). Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Conscious-
ness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 
Brown, S., & Steyvers, M. (2005). The dynamics of experimentally induced criterion shifts. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(4), 587–599. 
Chalmers, D. J. (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Neural 
correlates of consciousness: Empirical and conceptual questions , (pp (Vol. 350, pp. 17–39). Cam-
bridge, MA, US: The MIT Press. 
Cohen, M. A., Cavanagh, P., Chun, M. M., & Nakayama, K. (2012). The attentional requirements of 
consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(8), 411–417. 
Cohen, M. A., & Dennett, D. C. (2011). Consciousness cannot be separated from function. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 358–364. 
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts. 
Penguin Publishing Group. 
Dehaene, S., Changeux, J.-P., Naccache, L., Sackur, J., & Sergent, C. (2006). Conscious, preconscious, 
and subliminal processing: a testable taxonomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(5), 204–211. 
 26 
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017). What is consciousness, and could machines have it? Sci-
ence, 358(6362), 486–492. 
Dehaene, S., Naccache, L., Cohen, L., Bihan, D. L., Mangin, J. F., Poline, J. B., & Rivière, D. (2001). 
Cerebral mechanisms of word masking and unconscious repetition priming. Nature Neurosci-
ence, 4(7), 752–758. 
Del Cul, A., Dehaene, S., Reyes, P., Bravo, E., & Slachevsky, A. (2009). Causal role of prefrontal cortex 
in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 132(Pt 9), 2531–
2540. 
Eriksen, C. W. (1960). Discrimination and learning without awareness: a methodological survey and 
evaluation. Psychological Review, 67, 279–300. 
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental 
inquiry. The American Psychologist, 34(10), 906–911. 
Fleming, S. M. (2019). Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space. Retrieved from 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.00728 
Fleming, S. M., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2012). Metacognition: computation, biology and function. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 
367(1594), 1280–1286. 
Fleming, S. M., Ryu, J., Golfinos, J. G., & Blackmon, K. E. (2014). Domain-specific impairment in 
metacognitive accuracy following anterior prefrontal lesions. Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 
137(Pt 10), 2811–2822. 
Giles, N., Lau, H., & Odegaard, B. (2016). What Type of Awareness Does Binocular Rivalry Assess? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(10), 719–720. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2008). Reduction in Real Life. In J. Hohwy & J. Kallestrup (Eds.), Being Reduced: 
New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford University Press. 
Gorea, A., & Sagi, D. (2000). Failure to handle more than one internal representation in visual detec-
tion tasks. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
97(22), 12380–12384. 
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. 1966. New York. 
Gross, S., & Flombaum, J. (2017). Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The 
Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical Processes: Perceptual Consciousness and Cognitive 
Access. Mind & Language, 32(3), 358–391. 
Hannula, D. E., Simons, D. J., & Cohen, N. J. (2005). Imaging implicit perception: promise and pitfalls. 
Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 6(3), 247–255. 
Holender, D. (1986). Semantic activation without conscious identification in dichotic listening, para-
foveal vision, and visual masking: A survey and appraisal. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
9(1), 1–23. 
Irvine, E. (2012). Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective (Studies 
in Brain and Mind) (2013 edition). Springer. 
Kim, C.-Y., & Blake, R. (2005). Psychophysical magic: rendering the visible “invisible.” Trends in Cog-
nitive Sciences, 9(8), 381–388. 
Knotts, J. D., Lau, H., & Peters, M. A. K. (2018). Continuous flash suppression and monocular pattern 




Koizumi, A., Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2015). Does perceptual confidence facilitate cognitive control? 
Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 77(4), 1295–1306. 
Kouider, S., de Gardelle, V., Sackur, J., & Dupoux, E. (2010). How rich is consciousness? The partial 
awareness hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(7), 301–307. 
Kouider, S., & Dehaene, S. (2007). Levels of processing during non-conscious perception: a critical 
review of visual masking. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 362(1481), 857–875. 
Kouider, S., Dehaene, S., Jobert, A., & Le Bihan, D. (2007). Cerebral bases of subliminal and supra-
liminal priming during reading. Cerebral Cortex , 17(9), 2019–2029. 
Kouider, S., Sackur, J., & Gardelle, V. de. (2012). [Review of Do we still need phenomenal conscious-
ness? Comment on Block]. Trends in cognitive sciences, 16(3), 140–141; author reply 141–142. 
Kunimoto, C., Miller, J., & Pashler, H. (2001). Confidence and accuracy of near-threshold discrimina-
tion responses. Consciousness and Cognition, 10(3), 294–340. 
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010). How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness. Cognitive Neurosci-
ence, 1(3), 204–220. 
Lamy, D., Salti, M., & Bar-Haim, Y. (2009). Neural correlates of subjective awareness and unconscious 
processing: an ERP study. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(7), 1435–1446. 
Lau, H. C. (2008). Are we studying consciousness yet? In Frontiers of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lau, H. C., & Passingham, R. E. (2006). Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural corre-
late of visual consciousness. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America, 103(49), 18763–18768. 
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011). Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(8), 365–373. 
Lloyd, D. A., Abrahamyan, A., & Harris, J. A. (2013). Brain-stimulation induced blindsight: uncon-
scious vision or response bias? PloS One, 8(12), e82828. 
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A user’s guide, 2nd ed. Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates Publishers. 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2012). A signal detection theoretic approach for estimating metacognitive 
sensitivity from confidence ratings. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(1), 422–430. 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2014). Signal Detection Theory Analysis of Type 1 and Type 2 Data: Meta-
d′, Response-Specific Meta-d′, and the Unequal Variance SDT Model. In The Cognitive Neurosci-
ence of Metacognition (pp. 25–66). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2015). Manipulation of working memory contents selectively impairs met-
acognitive sensitivity in a concurrent visual discrimination task. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 
2015(1), niv002. 
Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2016). The signal processing architecture underlying subjective reports of 
sensory awareness. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2016(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niw002 
Maniscalco, B., McCurdy, L. Y., Odegaard, B., & Lau, H. (2017). Limited Cognitive Resources Explain 
a Trade-Off between Perceptual and Metacognitive Vigilance. The Journal of Neuroscience: The 
Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 37(5), 1213–1224. 
Maniscalco, B., Peters, M. A. K., & Lau, H. (2016). Heuristic use of perceptual evidence leads to disso-
ciation between performance and metacognitive sensitivity. Attention, Perception & Psychophys-
ics, 78(3), 923–937.
 28 
Mathewson, K. E., Gratton, G., Fabiani, M., Beck, D. M., & Ro, T. (2009). To see or not to see: pres-
timulus alpha phase predicts visual awareness. The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Jour-
nal of the Society for Neuroscience, 29(9), 2725–2732. 
Merikle, P. M., Smilek, D., & Eastwood, J. D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from 
cognitive psychology. Cognition, 79(1-2), 115–134. 
Michel, M. (2019). The Mismeasure of Consciousness: A problem of coordination for the Perceptual 
Awareness Scale. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/705509 
Michel, M., & Morales, J. (2019). Minority reports: Consciousness and the prefrontal cortex. Mind & 
Language, 30, 1473. 
Morales, J., Chiang, J., & Lau, H. (2015). Controlling for performance capacity confounds in neuroim-
aging studies of conscious awareness. Neuroscience of Consciousness, 2015(1). 
https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niv008 
Morales, J., & Lau, H. (forthcoming). The Neural Correlates of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450. 
Persaud, N., Davidson, M., Maniscalco, B., Mobbs, D., Passingham, R. E., Cowey, A., & Lau, H. (2011). 
Awareness-related activity in prefrontal and parietal cortices in blindsight reflects more than 
superior visual performance. NeuroImage, 58(2), 605–611. 
Persaud, N., McLeod, P., & Cowey, A. (2007). Post-decision wagering objectively measures awareness. 
Nature Neuroscience, 10(2), 257–261. 
Peters, M. A. K., & Lau, H. (2015). Human observers have optimal introspective access to perceptual 
processes even for visually masked stimuli. eLife, 4, e09651. 
Phillips, I. (2016). Consciousness and Criterion: On Block’s Case for Unconscious Seeing. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, 93(2), 419–451. 
Phillips, I. B. (2011). Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn’t Show. Mind & Language, 
26(4), 381–411. 
Proust, J. (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. OUP Oxford. 
Rahnev, D. A., Bahdo, L., de Lange, F. P., & Lau, H. (2012). Prestimulus hemodynamic activity in 
dorsal attention network is negatively associated with decision confidence in visual perception. 
Journal of Neurophysiology, 108(5), 1529–1536. 
Rahnev, D. A., Maniscalco, B., Luber, B., Lau, H., & Lisanby, S. H. (2012). Direct injection of noise to 
the visual cortex decreases accuracy but increases decision confidence. Journal of Neurophysiol-
ogy, 107(6), 1556–1563. 
Rahnev, D., Maniscalco, B., Graves, T., Huang, E., de Lange, F. P., & Lau, H. (2011). Attention induces 
conservative subjective biases in visual perception. Nature Neuroscience, 14(12), 1513–1515. 
Ramsøy, T. Z., & Overgaard, M. (2004). Introspection and subliminal perception. Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 3(1), 1–23. 
Rausch, M., & Zehetleitner, M. (2016). Visibility Is Not Equivalent to Confidence in a Low Contrast 
Orientation Discrimination Task. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 591. 
Robinson, Z., Maley, C. J., & Piccinini, G. (2015). Is Consciousness a Spandrel? Journal of the American 
Philosophical Association, 1(2), 365–383. 
Rosenthal, D. (2019). Consciousness and confidence. Neuropsychologia, 128, 255–265. 
 29 
Rosenthal, D. M. (1993). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cogni-
tion: An International Journal, 2(4), 355–363. 
Rosenthal, D. M. (2008). Consciousness and its function. Neuropsychologia, 46(3), 829–840. 
Rounis, E., Maniscalco, B., Rothwell, J. C., Passingham, R. E., & Lau, H. (2010). Theta-burst transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation to the prefrontal cortex impairs metacognitive visual awareness. Cog-
nitive Neuroscience, 1(3), 165–175. 
Ruby, E., Maniscalco, B., & Peters, M. A. K. (2018). On a “failed” attempt to manipulate visual meta-
cognition with transcranial magnetic stimulation to prefrontal cortex. Consciousness and Cog-
nition, 62, 34–41. 
Samaha, J., Barrett, J. J., Sheldon, A. D., LaRocque, J. J., & Postle, B. R. (2016). Dissociating Percep-
tual Confidence from Discrimination Accuracy Reveals No Influence of Metacognitive Awareness 
on Working Memory. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 851. 
Samaha, J., Iemi, L., & Postle, B. R. (2017). Prestimulus alpha-band power biases visual discrimina-
tion confidence, but not accuracy. Consciousness and Cognition, 54, 47–55. 
Samaha, J., Switzky, M., & Postle, B. R. (2019). Confidence boosts serial dependence in orientation 
estimation. Journal of Vision, 19(4), 25. 
Sandberg, K., Timmermans, B., Overgaard, M., & Cleeremans, A. (2010). Measuring consciousness: is 
one measure better than the other? Consciousness and Cognition, 19(4), 1069–1078. 
Schwitzgebel, E. (2011). Perplexities of Consciousness. The MIT Press. 
Sergent, C., & Dehaene, S. (2004). Neural processes underlying conscious perception: experimental 
findings and a global neuronal workspace framework. Journal of Physiology, Paris, 98(4-6), 374–
384. 
Shaver, E., Maniscalco, B., & Lau, H. (2008). Awareness as Confidence. Anthropology and Philosophy, 
9(1/2), 58–65. 
Shoemaker, S. (1981). Some Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Topics, 12(1), 93–119. 
Snodgrass, M., Bernat, E., & Shevrin, H. (2004). [Review of Unconscious perception: a model-based 
approach to method and evidence]. Perception & psychophysics, 66(5), 846–867. 
Spener, M. (n.d.). Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 
Taylor, E. (2016). Explanation and the Explanatory Gap. Acta Analytica, 31(1), 77–88. 
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015). No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the 
True Neural Correlates of Consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(12), 757–770. 
Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A Case Study and Implications. Oxford University Press. 
Weiskrantz, L., Barbur, J. L., & Sahraie, A. (1995). Parameters affecting conscious versus unconscious 
visual discrimination with damage to the visual cortex (V1). Proceedings of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences of the United States of America, 92(13), 6122–6126. 
